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"More Negotiation and Less Demonstrations":
The NAACP, SCLC, and Racial Conflict in
Pensacola, 1970-1978
By J. Michael Butler

T

he civil rights movement is a topic that continues to inspire
a tremendous amount of scholarly research. One topic that
remains relatively unexplored, though, is the post-1960s
struggle for black equality. Traditional narratives typically use the
1968 assassination of Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. as their symbolic c o n c l ~ s i o n .Yet
~ the fight against racial injustice continued
beyond King's death, and the next decade brought new issues for
civil rights activists. One of the most fascinating concerns the role
traditional organizations, particularIy the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), played in local camJ. Michael Butler received his B.,4. from Spring Hill College in Mobile, Alabama,
and earned his M.A. and Ph.D. in History from the University of Mississippi. He is
Associate Professor of History at South Georgia College. The author thanks Dr. F.
Lindsay Moffett for his questions, comments, and critiques on earlier versions of
this essav. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2007 annual meeting of the Florida Conference of Historians.
1. One of the few scholars who traces the legacy of the civil rights movement
into the 1970s and 1980s is Timothy Minchin. In Hiring the Black Worker: The
Racial Integration of the Southern Textile Indust?, 1960-1980 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1999) and "Don't Sl~epwith Stevens!": TheJ
P. Stevens Campaign and the Struggle to Organize the South, 1963-80 (Gainesville:
University Press of Florida, 2005), Minchin argues that the civil rights movement provided black workers with experience in direct action protests that
carried into their involvement with labor unions. Although my essay does not
address the movement's impact on southern labor, Minchin provides an
example of how scholars interpret continuity in post-1960s civil rights issues.
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paigns for black equality. Differences between the goals and tactics each used during campaigns of the 1960s have been well documented. However, the effect those differences had on grassroots
campaigns beyond that tumultuous decade is a narrative largely
untold. One struggle that illuminates the organizational conflict
took place in northwest Florida during the mid-1970s.
On February 24, 1975, approximately five hundred blacks gathered at the Escambia County Sheriffs Department in Pensacola,
Florida, to demonstrate against what they considered a grave injustice. Two months earlier, Deputy Douglas Raines shot and killed a
young black man named Wendel Blackwell from a distance of three
feet. Despite substantial evidence that suggested foul play, a grand
jury quickly declared the incident "justifiable homicide" and the
sheriff, Royal Untreiner, refused to take any disciplinary action
against Raines.* Blackwell's death represented the latest in a series
of conflicts between the local white power structure and black residents, who had grown increasingly frustrated with their social and
economic marginalization. Subsequently, the presidents of the
county branches of the SCLC and NAACP, Reverends H. K.
Matthews and B. J. Brooks, respectively, organized a series of nonviolent demonstrations that reminded many of the previous decade's
civil rights campaigns. Blacks routinely gathered on the front lawn
of the county sheriffs department, carried protest signs, sang familiar spirituals, chanted popular slogans, and prayed. The demonstrations that occurred nearly every evening for two months
followed a familiar pattern. Matthews and Brooks knew that
patience with the protests had grown thin, but they did not anticipate the severity of their retribution.
Ajovial crowd formed for the February 24thprotest. Protestors
joked with each other, sang uplifting religious choruses, and conversed with deputies. As he had done numerous times on previous
evenings, Rev. Matthews addressed the crowd through a bullhorn.
He repeated black grievances, demanded the firing of Raines, and
led the group in prayer. Another minister, Rev. Jimmie Lee
Savage, took the bullhorn from Matthews and led the crowd in the
same mantra that he had conducted at earlier demonstrations:
"Two, four, six, eight, who shall we incarcerate? Untreiner, Raines,
the whole damn bunch!" Soon after the chant ended, seventy

2.

PensacolaJou.ma1, 23 January 1975.
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nightstick-wielding deputies moved into the crowd. They arrested
forty-seven blacks on misdemeanor charges, including Brooks and
Matthews; three days later officials added felony extortion to
charges against the two leaders. Their cases went to trial the followingJune and an all-white jury found the two ministers guilty.
The prosecution singled out Matthews as the more dangerous of
the two, and witnesses testified that he alone threatened to "assassinate," not "incarcerate," the county sheriff and deputy.
Subsequently, Brooks received probation while a judge sentenced
Matthews to five years at hard labor in the Florida State
Penitentiar~.~The controversial sentence launched a series of
events that virtually destroyed the once-vigorous civil rights movement in northwest Florida.
The demonstrations and felony extortion trials of Brooks and
Matthews highlight the roles national organizations played in local
affairs and complicate our understanding of the situation with two
additional sets of issues. First, it demonstrates that tensions within
the NAACP distanced the local branch from its state and national
offices. Second, the struggle in northwest Florida suggests that
strains also existed between the groups involved in black grassroots
activities, namely the NAACP, and the SCLC. Both conflicts eventually undermined and divided local leaders at the expense of
their members. In fact, the self-interests of the NAACP and SCLC
national offices, along with their mutual distrust and jealousy,
proved as damaging to the Pensacola movement as the white resistance activists encountered. An examination of the Pensacola situation and the trial of Brooks and Matthews provides an
opportunity to analyze the goals and influence of civil rights organizations such as the NAACP and SCLC in the decade after the
1960s.
The hostilities that surfaced in Florida's panhandle between
the SCLC and NAACP during the 1970s did not develop as the
result of indigenous affairs alone. The organizational posturing
and gamesmanship each organization practiced predated the
Pensacola events and provided an element of historical continuity
to the local struggle. An uneasy alliance had characterized the
relationship between the NAACP and SCLC since the latter's 195'7
3.

H. K. Matthews and J. Michael Butler, V i c t q After the Fall (Montgomery:
NewSouth Books, 2007) 185-190; Pensacoh Journal, 10 June 1975; Pensacoh
Nezus, 17 July 1975.
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formation. On several levels, Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King created
the SCLC as a response to NACCP strategies. The NAACP and its
mercurial president, Roy Wilkins, emphasized deliberate legal
actions against segregated institutions, most notably schools, as the
key to bringing social change for blacks. King, on the other hand,
stressed the importance of nonviolent direct action mass campaigns in obtaining racial equality. The recently concluded
Montgomery bus boycott supported such reasoning, but Wilkins
believed that mass actions would fail at the national level and
intensify white resistance.
On a less philosophical level, the SCLC potentiallyjeopardized
the NAACP's very existence. The SCLC use of the black church as
its primary organizational institution threatened to pull a substantial number of members-and
tremendous revenue-from
NAACP rolls. The fact that the new group followed a charismatic
and nationally recognized leader made that threat even more likely to Roy Wilkins. King recognized the potential conflict and carefully tried to avoid raising the animus of the older organization.
For instance, he repeatedly stated that his group would only support and compliment NAACP activities. Initially SCLC even
refused to accept individual memberships for the sake of organizational unity. However, NAACP leaders thought only one group
could represent blacks and the national office tightened control of
its state and local branches to deter cooperation with the SCLC. In
fact, the NAACP established voter and member registration campaigns that directly rivaled similar SCLC programs as early as 1957.
The discord that existed between the two organizations intensified
with each of King's public campaigns, particularly in 1963.
Jealousy, suspicion, and mistrust divided the NAACP and the SCLC
for the remainder of King's life.4 The tensions that characterized
the relationship possessed a historical foundation that reemerged
in northwest Florida during the 1970s.
4.

For more on the SCLC and its tumultuous relationship with the NAACP see
Taylor Branch's magnificent trilogy of King's life: Parting the Watus: American
in the King Years, 1954-1963 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), Bearing the
Cross: American in the King Years, 1963-1965 (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1998), At Canaan's Edge: American in the King Years, 1965-1968 (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 2006); see also David J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin
Luther King and the Sontthm Leadership Conference (New York: William Morrow,
1986) and Adam Fairclough, To Redeem the Soul of America: The Southern
Christian Leadership Conference and Martin Luther King, Jr. (Athens: University
of Georgia Press, 198'7).
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The organizational circumstances that typified the civil rights
movement on a national level also characterized the struggle for
black equality in Escambia County. On June 15,1919,the Pensacola
Chapter of the NAACP held its first meeting. The branch formed to
combat Florida's white primary-a
tactic that effectively disfranchised black voters-through the judicial process and enrolled seventy-three members in its first year of existence. Consequently,
Escambia County became the first location in Florida where blacks
could vote since Reconstruction ended in 1877. The Pensacola
NAACP conducted relatively few campaigns in the post-World War
I1 era, but that changed when an energetic young minister named
Rev. William C. Dobbins came to the city in 1959.
Dobbins, who transferred from a church in Montgomery,
Alabama, to Pensacola's St. Paul United Methodist Church, made
social justice the focus of his ministry and used Biblical teachings
to justifjr civil rights activities. He spoke against the racial conditions that existed in Pensacola and became an active member of
the local NAACP. He also revived the dormant local NAACP
Youth Council and brought the sit-in movement to downtown
lunch counters in 1961. The sit-ins represented the first indigenous direct action campaign in Pensacola during the post-World
War I1 era and solidified a deep black mistrust of local law enforcement that later characterized the movement. During the June 1'7
sit-in whites burned protestors with lit cigarettes, doused them with
battery acid, and sprayed insecticide in the eyes of one girl. Police
arrested no one for the attacks and encouraged additional assaults
by laughing at the actions. As the sit-ins and subsequent boycotts
continued, officers arrested blacks on questionable trespassing,
illegal boycott, public cursing, and disorderly conduct charges.
On some occasions, officers retrieved items from targeted stores,
placed them in demonstrators' pockets, and arrested them for
shoplifting. Yet by the end of the1961 summer, over thirty downtown stores succumbed to the economic pressure the sit-ins created and either hired black employees or integrated their dining
facilities. When Dobbins left Pensacola for a church in Alabama
soon after the sit-ins ended in 1962, one of his most trusted associates became the recognized leader of the local freedom ~ t r u g g l e . ~
5.

"NAACPBranch files, Pensacola, Florida, 1919, 1921-28,"Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C., NAACP papers, volume I, box (342. Horace Hanison, telephone interview with author, Pensacola, Florida, March 13, 2006; Raymon
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Rev. H. K Matthews served as president of the NAACP Youth
Council during the sit-ins and, for a brief period, also led the adult
branch. During his tenure with the NAACP Matthews organized
black voter registration campaigns, continued the struggle to integrate public facilities, supported strikes at two area hospitals, and
demanded that the city and private business owners hire blacks in
meaningful employment.
By the end of the decade, H. K. Matthews was a very public figure in Escambia County. He frequently appeared on a weekly community affairs television program in Pensacola where he voiced
and explained the grievances of local blacks. Matthews used the
show to "get the word out that there were things that blacks were
not privileged to as citizens of the city" and often addressed controversial topics, such as the white use of derogatory language in
addressing African Americans. In addition to the television program, Matthews also wrote frequent columns for the Pensacola News
Journal and Pensacola Call and Post, the city's only black newspaper.
The opinionated minister spoke to both races in his articles, and
did not change his rhetoric to make his stance more attractive to
either race or any social class. Matthews began one of his first published essays by declaring, "Black American have waited and waited, and prayed and begged to be granted their full rights under
the Constitution. We have become tired of waiting. We intend to
have what belongs to us right now." "The foot of the oppressor,"
he concluded, "is on our neck, and we intend to get it off. No sacrifice is too great in order for us to do so." His bold and direct language made Matthews a hero in the black community. He did not
mince words when addressing local racism and confronted the
local white power structure with little concern for his personal safety. According to one area publication, Matthews' supporters considered him "a saint left here to fill in the holes of justice and
defend the rights of black people to live, work, learn, and play in
the mainstream of a wealthy America." White residents in the
Florida panhandle, however, despised Matthews more with each of
his successful civil rights campaigns. Yet as the decade passed,

Harvey, telephone interview with author, Pensacola, Florida, March 15,2006;
"Newsletter,"NAACP Youth Council publication,July 8, 1961, private collection, Mary Harrison Washington. For more on the Pensacola sit-ins and the
C. Dobbins played in the area civil rights movement see Matthews
role Rev. Mr.
and Butler, Victoq After the Fall, 68-80.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol86/iss1/6

6

Butler: More Negotiation and Less Demonstrations: The NAACP, SCLC, and Ra

Matthews grew increasingly frustrated with what he interpreted as
a plethora of unnecessary rules, regulations, and restraints the
NAACP imposed upon local chapters. He also believed that the
state and national organizational hierarchy disproved of his bold
and impassioned public pronouncements. His discontent with the
organization mirrored the criticism other blacks, including King,
had voiced earlier concerning the association. In short, Matthews
recalled, "It was not the tactics, but rather the non-tactics of the
NAACP that concerned me." He also perceived that local blacks
"realized that the NAACP was just not as assertive as they had been
in the past and people were voicing their concerns about the
group's limitations to me."6
In January 19'70, therefore, H. K. Matthews formed the
Escambia County Chapter of the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference (SCLC) and became the local branch's first president.
Respect and admiration for Dr. King first attracted Matthews to the
SCLC and he followed in his hero's footsteps. Matthews also
admired SCLC tactics and its relatively autonomous relationship
between the national office and local chapters. Despite the
SCLC's decline as an influential civil rights organization on the
national level following King's 1968 death, Matthews supported
the group because he believed it presented the best opportunity
for blacks to achieve racial equality in Pensacola. However, he
remained a member of the county NAACP and served as its Youth
Council leader. Matthews, like King before him, stressed that he
did not intend for the SCLC to compete with the NAACP in any
way. According to the minister, local blacks merely desired "a
sense of belonging and equality" in northwest Florida that the
NAACP did not provide for all. Matthews intended the SCLC to
carry out many activities the increasingly cautious NAACP did not
publicly support.7 Philosophical differences, rather than competition or hostility differentiated the organizations on a local level.
For Pensacola activists, however, the tension that existed between
the NAACP and SCLC on the national level during the previous
decade would come to divide the local organizations.
Within its first year of operation, the Escambia SCLC attracted
over 300 members. Many also belonged to the Pensacola NAACP,
6.

H. K, Matthews, interview with author, February 13, 2002, Douglas, Georgia
(herinafter cited as Matthews interview); Pensacola Call and Post, 7 June 1969;
Broadview, August 1971, 12-16; Matthews and Butler, VictoryAftPT the Fall, 110-13.

7.

Matthews, interview.
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which had over 600 registered members. Local blacks possessed
dual memberships because B. J. Brooks and Matthews, the presidents of the two organizations, emphasized the importance of
activists joining both organizaitons. Matthews recalled, "We were
just as one, basically, because the leadership and membership was
so united. When we had mass meetings, we did not have a NAACP
mass meeting or a SCLC mass meeting. We had a community mass
meeting," which Matthews and Brooksjointly led.8
The two organizations worked together during two incidents
that further polarized the races in northwest Florida. In December
1972, simmering racial tensions erupted and engulfed the largest
and most segregated school in the area, Escambia High. The
brawl that broke out between black and white students culminated
weeks of contention over the school's use of Confederate symbols.
The Florida NAACP sent its Field Director, Rev. R. N. Gooden, to
Pensacola to assist local leaders in their response to the latest disturbance. When school board officials refused to acknowledge the
divisiveness of the school's symbols, Gooden, Brooks, and
Matthews organized a black student boycott of county schools to
protest the Rebel mascot and accompanying Confederate imagery
at Escambia High Scho01.~
Later the same year, Pensacola NAACP and Escambia County
SCLC continued their pattern of cooperation when five black
boaters from Atlanta disappeared while fishing in local waters.
The groups launched an investigation after suspicions surfaced
that whites may have murdered the men. On a visit to Pensacola,
Ralph Abernathy, the president of the national SCLC, claimed that
the five "were taken and beaten and killed by racist, segregationist
forces" in the "racist community" and demanded justice in the
matter. Local law enforcement officials and political leaders dismissed Abernathy's allegations and refused to meet with any black
leader concerning the case.1°
Although the state NAACP intervened in the EHS controversy
and the national SCLC directed the discourse concerning the
"Atlanta Five" disappearances, the local chapters of both groups
participated in protests concerning both incidents. The indige8.
9.

10

Matthews, interview ; Matthews and Butler, Victoq After the Fall, 106-09.
Matthews and Butler, Victoq After the Fall, chapter 5 ; Pensacola Journal, 13
December 1974.
See Matthews and Butler, V i c t q Afer th.e Fall, 153-162.
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nous responses reveal the unity that initially existed between the
SCLC and NAACP in northwest Florida. But the event that tested
the organizational commitment to racial justice in Pensacola
occurred on December 20,1974 when, after a fifteen-minute highspeed car chase, Escambia County Sheriff s Deputy Douglas Raines
shot an unarmed black man named Wendel Blackwell from a
three-foot distance.
The Blackwell shooting represented the pinnacle of local
black apprehensions concerning county law enforcement officials.
The distrust that stemmed from the 1961 sit-ins had grown during
the Escambia High symbols controversy, as black leaders accused
deputies of once again standing by idly as whites intimidated and
attacked black students. Local civil rights leaders, particularly H.
K. Matthews, obtained testimony from black residents who claimed
that white deputies pulled over their vehicles even though the drivers broke no laws, wrote tickets for non-existent offenses, and brutalized some motorists for questioning their motive^.^' Racial
profiling plagued the relationship between blacks and area officers
long before the term entered the nation's vocabulary, and suspicions that the sheriffs department conspired to conceal the true
fate of the Atlanta boaters inflamed the already blazing black
resentment of police officers in the panhandle. One national
SCLC official accused local law enforcement officers of "suppressing crucial evidence" in "one of the biggest mass murders this state
has ever seen." Although no evidence substantiated the claim, the
accusation resonated with local blacks who believed county
deputies had "whitewashed and covered up" past racial incidents
in the city. As tensions reached a dangerously high level in the
aftermath of Wendel Blackwell's death, State Attorney Curtis
Golden personally investigated the Blackwell shooting and promised to meet with black representatives concerning his findings.
However, Golden's conclusion that Raines shot Blackwell in selfdefense deepened black suspicions that a white conspiracy existed
within and extended beyond the Escambia County Sheriffs
~e~artmen
l 2t .
Early in 19'75, local NAACP and SCLC chapters organized the
black outcry for justice in the matter of Wendel Blackwell's death.
11. H. K. Matthews, interview with author, February 13, 2002, Douglas, Georgia.
12. Matthews and Butler, Victoly After the Fall, 173-74; PensacolaJournal, 13, 16, 17,
and 18 December 1974; Pensacola Naus-JournaZ, 15 December 1974;
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MORENEGOTIATION
AND LESSDEMONSTRATIONS 79
For over two months the organizations held nightly mass meetings
at local churches, filling the sanctuaries with their calls for the termination of Deputy Raines and a meeting with Sheriff Royal
Untreiner to discuss black concerns. In addition, the SCLC and
NAACP initiated picket lines in front of the county sheriffs department and boycotted all stores in downtown Pensacola to bring
attention to their grievances.
When Untreiner refused to acknowledge SCLC or NAACP
leaders, most notably H. K Matthews, the groups demanded that
Governor Reubin Askew remove Untreiner from his position. On
January 31, Matthews, Brooks, and Rev. R. N. Gooden, the Field
Secretary for the Florida NAACP, led approximately 100 NAACP
and SCLC members from Escambia County to the governor's mansion in Tallahassee to participate in a candlelight vigil for Wendel
Blackwell. After thirty minutes of protest, Governor Askew, a
Pensacola native, agreed to meet with Matthews, Brooks, Gooden,
and two other members of the group.
During the hour-long meeting, black spokespersons told the
governor that violence would engulf Pensacola unless he did something to alleviate racial tensions in the city. The black contingent
insisted Askew suspend Raines and remove Untreiner from his
position. One of those present told the governor that area blacks
feared white police officers, armed themselves for protection, and
claimed, "If another black is shot" by a white deputy in Pensacola
"we are going to be walking in blood." Askew ended the meeting
with no promises but told the group he would urge Sheriff
Untriener to meet with area black leaders.13 As a result of the
Tallahassee trip, Pensacola activists encountered a new obstaclethe state and national NAACP.
In the days leading to the Tallahassee demonstration,
Governor Askew received word of the coming caravan and called
Florida NAACP president Charles Cherry. Askew, who had worked
with Cherry on previous issues and considered him to be a close
associate, requested that he prevent the protesters from carrying
through with their plans. Cherry wished to maintain his influence
with the governor and asked Gooden and Brooks, both NAACP
officeholders, to postpone their trip. The two ignored Cherry's
request. In turn, Cherry reported their perceived insubordination
to the national office and the "March on Tallahassee," as the
13. Pensacola Journal, 1 February 1975.
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NAACP called it, created a rift between the local and state offices
that never mended fully. Although Gooden deemed the march a
success because it captured the governor's attention, Gloster B.
Current, the national NAACP Director of Branches and Field
Administration, reprimanded the field secretary for his endeavors.
In a letter to Gooden, Current admitted, "I was a little disturbed
that a local branch would undertake such a venture without the
knowledge and authorization of the state and national offices."
Current promised to monitor the Pensacola situation but warned
"it will be most important that the state, regional and national
offices be kept advised of prospective actions before they are
engaged in."I4 Thereafter, mistrust and suspicion characterized
the relationship between the Pensacola NAACP chapter and its
state and national supervisors for the duration of local protests.
An organization that initially supported the Escambia County freedom struggle soon became one of its greatest obstacles. While the
NAACP imposed its chain of command upon local leaders, black
protests continued in northwest Florida. The demonstrations
peaked with the February 24 arrests of Brooks and Matthews.
Despite their impending trials, Matthews and Brooks continued their mass meetings and public protests while the national
offices of the NAACP and SCLC remained silent. On March 8 the
Florida NAACP's Board of Directors members met Pensacola leaders and appealed to the national office for legal assistance, organizational aid, and closer cooperation with the city branch.15 The
association ignored the plea. H. K. Matthews expressed his growing frustration with both organizations and accused them of disregarding problems their Escambia County chapters faced, even
though the groups "worked for every other city in Florida." Local
disillusionment with national organization tactics became evident
during mass meetings. Field Secretary Gooden echoed black irritation in one address by declaring, "We've been scuffling down
here for almost four months, and it seems that the more we scuffle, the more we dig ourselves in a hole."16
14. Letter, Cherry to Current, March 6,1975, "NAACP Branch Department Files,
Florida, Pensacola Branch, 197477," NAACP papers, part VI, box C83;
"NAACP Branch Department Files, Field Staff, R. N. Gooden
Correspondence, 1973-75," NAACP papers, part 17,box C29.
15. St. Petenburg Times, 2 March 1975; Pensacola Journ.al, 27 February 1975;
Pensacola-NewsJournal, 2 and 9 March 2, 1975.
16. PensacolaJournal, 27 March 1975.
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Local exasperation increased when the Florida Department
of Transportation suspended B. J. Brooks from his $200 per week
job without pay for "conduct unbecoming a Department of
Transportation employee." The department's county supervisor
said the agency made the decision due to Brooks' felony charges,
citing a Florida statute that banned anyone accused of a felony
from state employment. The department conducted no investigation into the charges, but promised Brooks automatic reinstatement upon acquittal and immediate termination if
convicted. The national NAACP called the suspension "an act of
discrimination and a complete mockery of our system ofjustice."
Questioning the department's decision more than a month after
his arrest, Brooks maintained that he had never been convicted
of a crime nor received due process and pled, "This is practically
my whole livelihood they're playing around with." Although he
owned a local service station, the business did not replace income
Brooks lost due to his suspension. Whether or not the state
intended to send Brooks a message with the suspension, he interpreted it as such and vowed to decrease his activities in the
Pensacola movement. Brooks appealed his suspension to the
Escambia County Career Service Commission less than two weeks
after he received it." Matthews and Gooden continued to support their fellow activist, unaware that the NAACP national and
state offices planned to fully withdraw support from the
Pensacola movement.
Although the NAACP's defense of Brooks at a time when the
organization planned to abandon the Pensacola movement
appears contradictory, such was not the case. Indeed, Brooks's suspension and delicate financial situation strengthened the position
of the national and state offices because it gave them unprecedented power of action in Escambia County. Simply put, Brooks had
to follow order that filtered down through the NACCP hierarchy
as long as his livelihood depended upon the legal support that the
organization provided. This uneven power relationship had a
tremendous impact on racial affairs in Florida's Panhandle as the
national NAACP office placed its interests above the needs of those
who participated in the local struggle.
17. PensacolaJournal, 27 and 28 March 2'7, 1975; "NAACP Legal Department Case
Files, Florida, Brooks v. Florida Department of Transpmtation, April 1975,"
NAACP papers, part V, box 390.
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The rift between the state and local NAACP that began after
Gooden and Brooks led their pilgrimage to the governor's mansion on January 31, widened after the February 24 arrests, despite
the fact that Rev. Gooden played no role in the jailhouse demonstrations. The primary reason Cherry wanted to distance his
organization from the Pensacola movement was the presence of H.
K. Matthews. On March 6, Cherry wrote a letter to NAACP official
Gloster Current and explained his interpretation of the Escambia
County situation to the national office. Cherry admitted that
Pensacola blacks needed help from their group because "it is a very
conservative town, to say the least, and has a long history of
unsolved crimes committed by whites against blacks." Yet Cherry
believed the NAACP could provide only limited assistance in the
area. "The black leadership has been diluted," he wrote, "because
the Regional Coordinator of the SCLC, Rev. H. K. Matthews
resides in Pensacola." Cherry described Matthews as "the most
vocal, outspoken, and perhaps the most articulate Black Civil
Rights leader and minister in" the area. The state NAACP president perceptively recognized Matthews as the most powerful and
influential black leader in Escambia County, but described him as
an impediment to NAACP goals. His methods seemed too radical
for Cherry, who claimed Matthews "refused to work with Brooks"
and the local NAACP chapter. In addition, he claimed that
Matthews' "credibility has been questioned and attacked by the
community on several occasions." As a result of the influential role
Matthews occupied, "ministers and other leaders . . . have been
non-supportive of the Pensacola movement.'? Cherry concluded
his erroneous observations on the Pensacola struggle by stating,
"Most of the ingredients exist in Pensacola for a good branch.
Organization, however, is lacking. Rhetoric and emotional appeal,
as has been provided during the past 10 weeks, is not what is needed."18 As the exchange of letters suggests, the state NAACP not
only limited the activities of its Pensacola chapter during a vital
period; it also sought to undermine the local leader of its rival
SCLC branch.
Correspondence between NAACP officials at the state and
national levels reveal a deliberate refusal to intervene fully in the
Pensacola movement while H. K. Matthews remained the area's
18. Letter, Cherry to Current, March 6,1975, "NAACPBranch Department Files,
Florida, Pensacola Branch, 197477," NAACP papers, part VI, box C83.
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foremost black spokesman. National leaders had already reprimanded R. N. Gooden for circumventing their offices and held a
degree of leverage in their relationship with the minister, as he
served as state field director and ultimately answered to Charles
Cherry. B. J. Brooks also provided few troubles for the organization and seemed unlikely to do so in the future due to his precarious economic situation. Yet the national office had no such
control over the passionate and often controversial Matthews.
Worse yet, he belonged to a competing organization that NAACP
officials viewed as more radical and confrontational than theirs.
The NAACP did not approve of the boycotts, demonstrations, or
mass meetings that characterized the black freedom struggle in
northwest Florida. The numerous restrictions the group imposed
upon activists and the deliberate measures it took in combating
racism provided the principal justifications for Matthews' forrnation of the Escambia County SCLC, concerns that similarly
prompted Dr. King to create the organization nearly twenty years
earlier. The NAACP became even more cautious in their campaigns during the 1970s, as movement goals and objectives experienced constant revision in a society where de facto racism had
replaced de jure segregation as the major obstacle blacks faced in
the United States. On a more practical level, Pensacola blacks recognized H. K. Matthews as their primary spokesman and followed
his protest strategies, regardless of the NAACP's stance on such
tactics. Furthermore, the NAACP possessed no authority over the
popular firebrand and risked alienating its members-or worseby publicly repudiating Matthews and his methods. Philosophical
and personal differences, therefore, continued to separate the
SCLC and NAACP in 19'75 and limited the effectiveness both
organizations had in the Pensacola movement. Cherry simply
would not provide assistance to an area whose black residents followed the likes of Matthews and he did everything he could to convince the national office that his convictions were correct, even if
it meant exaggerating, fabricating, or creating divisions within the
black leadership ranks in Escambia County. Instead of working to
improve the deplorable state of racial affairs in Florida's panhandle, the state NAACP spent its time and energies on institutional
pursuits at the expense of local blacks.
The economic and organizational pressures exerted on BJ.
Brooks produced the desired results. Less than a month after losing his job, Brooks publicly distanced the NAACP from H. K.
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Matthews and the SCLC, declaring, "I can no longer support the
ideas and philosophies of the present leadership of the protest."
He explained that Matthews and Gooden "do not have the interest
of our people at heart" and called their tactics "underhanded."
Brooks summarized his decision by stating, "It is not the policy of
the NAACP to encourage citizens to break the law, and it is not the
policy of the organization to castigate citizens for non-involvement," tactics he claimed the others embraced. Brooks asserted
that Matthews and Gooden "want to blow this thing up" in
Pensacola despite NAACP pleas to the contrary. He denied that
the Department of Transportation suspension influenced the leadership split, at the same time the NAACP provided legal counsel
for Brooks and pledged to overturn his suspension. It is doubtful
that the NAACP would have expended time and resources on a
person who remained closely allied with someone it considered
anathema to their philosophy. Regardless of his reasons, Brooks
pledged never again to petition publicly for racial equality in
Escambia County.lg His denunciation of Matthews, a man he once
considered his best friend, demonstrates the degree to which the
NAACP national office undermined the Pensacola movement as it
created irreparable divisions between local leaders.
On May 2, the state NAACP followed the example set by the
national office and dismissed R. N. Gooden as Florida Field
Director of the organization. According to state president Charles
Cherry, the NAACP terminated its relationship with Gooden
because it did not agree with the methods he used to resolve tensions between area blacks and the Escambia County Sheriffs
Department. Cherry stated that the NAACP asked its representatives to "use more negotiation and less demonstrations" in communicating with white leaders in the panhandle. Simply put, Gooden
had "led too many demonstrations in Pensacola." Perhaps most
importantly, Cherry claimed that Gooden "defected to the SCLC."
He cited the fact that the NAACP paid for none of Gooden's seventeen documented trips to Escambia County as proof that the
minister received payment from the rival organization, thus abandoning his responsibilities as an NAACP representative. Cherry
denounced Gooden for joining in SCLC activities because the
organization advocated direct action protests, while the NAACP
utilized legal maneuvering and private negotiations to achieve
19. Pensacola Journal, 11, 24, and 26 April 1975; Pensacola News, 17 April 1975.
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racial harmony. Cherry declared his organization's Escambia
County branch "has had nightly marches and other direct action"
protests "and we feel that is wrong."*'
Gloster Current endorsed Cherry's decision by deeming
Gooden's actions "extremely covert," although no one from the
national office met with Gooden or presented him with any evidence that he had broken NAACP regulations. Gooden also stated
that he, not the SCLC, paid for his trips from Tallahassee to
Pensacola and noted that he had served the NAACP without pay
since he accepted the position of state field director in 19'72.
Gooden claimed that the "SCLC has by no means tried to divide the
leadership in this community in order to build itself," despite
Cherry's allegations. He concluded that his dismissal occurred "for
reasons other than those submitted by Mr. Cherry." The public battle between Gooden and Cherry had an immediate impact upon the
Pensacola movement. After his controversial dismissal and reprimand from the NAACP, Gooden returned to Tallahassee to spend
more time with his church and ministry. The actions of Gooden and
Cherry, and the earlier steps involving B. J. Brooks, demonstrated
that the NAACP abandoned the Escambia County movement at its
most criticaljuncture for tactical and personal reasonsa21
B. J. Brooks protested the dismissal of R. N. Gooden from his
position as state NAACP field director. He wrote a letter to the
NAACP Board of Directors and explained why Cherry should reinstate the minister. According to Brooks, "Rev. Gooden is the most
vocal voice for the NAACP in Florida" and his dismissal "ought not
be tolerated by the national office." If the decision stood, Brooks
argued, "the NAACP will be the loser in Florida and the SCLC
would most certainly take advantage of this articulation and ability
to corrale [sic] people." Finally, Brooks argued that Gooden "will
continue to be actively involved (in the Pensacola movement),
whether it is with the NAACP or not." He concluded his passionate note by further accusing president Cherry of being "remiss in
his duties by not rendering assistance to the Pensacola branch. We
pay our assessment and feel that we are entitled to whatever assistance the Conference can give."22
20. "NAACP Branch Department Files, Field Staff, R.
Correspondence, 1973-75, NAACP papers, part J'I, box C29.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
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The correspondence demonstrated a division within the
NAACP and between it and the SCLC. The fact that Brooks criticized Cherry so harshly after following his earlier recommendation
to distance himself from Gooden and Matthews suggests that Brooks
did not fully agree with the order. It is very likely that the organization's leaders used Brooks's financial situation against him in their
mandate to separate him from the controversial Pensacola ministers. Simply put, Brooks needed the NAACP to provide counsel for
his appeal with the Department of Transportation and in his upcoming felony trial. He had a chance to express his frustrations with
Cherry when the NAACP official dismissed Gooden and took advantage of the opportunity. He used the NAACP's struggle with SCLC
to justify his anger by maintaining that the rival organization would
use the Gooden situation to their potential advantage. Basing his
criticism on the best interests of the NAACP, Brooks remained loyal
to the national office and protected himself from the abandonment
Matthews and Gooden experienced. Still, the letter illustrates that
tactical and philosophical divisions embittered relationships within
groups as well as between leaders of competing organizations.
The dissention within the NAACP branches and between its
national office and the SCLC peaked in the days leading to the felony
trials of B. J. Brooks and H. K. Matthews. The conflict between movement leaders undoubtedly provided a distraction for the two men and
their NAACP-appointed lawyer, Ed Duffee, with predictable unsatisfactory results. Duffee ignored Matthews' demand to testiq on his
own behalf and, according to the opinionated minister, proved an
incompetent attorney. Indeed, Duffee submitted his request to
change the trial venue nine days after the legal deadline for such
motions had passed, and called only two witnesses to testify for the
defense. His passive strategy fueled Matthews' criticism. On June 10,
19'75,an all-whitejury found Brooks and Matthews guilty of extortion
by threat after only forty-five minutes of deliberations, despite a paucity of evidence offered against them. The verdict surprised few. The
two activists faced a maximum penalty of fifteen years in state prison
for the seconddegree felony conviction.Judge Kiske Beall delayed his
sentencing until July 24 in order to conduct an inquiry into each
man's background. In the meantime, Duffee appealed the verdict
and the court released both men on $20,000 bond each.23
23. Florida v. Brooks and Matthews, case number 75-390,June 9-10, 1975, case file;
Pensacola Journal, 1 1June 1975; Pensacola Nmsjournal, 13July 1975.
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Matthews and Brooks responded to the verdict in a manner
that reflected their conflicting personalities, leadership styles, and
organizational affiliations. Matthews called the decision "Justice,
Escambia County style" and "the penalty you pay for being black in
this community." He predicted that the "conviction will be overturned and I will probably never serve any jail sentence" because
"somewhere in the state there are people who would sit on an honestjury and listen to evidence proving" his innocence. He fired Ed
Duffee and hired a local attorney, Paul Shimek, to represent him
at future appeals. B. J. Brooks, on the other hand, refused to comment on the decision, promising local whites, "I'm just not going
to make any statements relative to the conviction" and distancing
himself from Matthews and his bold post-trial proclamations.
Brooks rebuked Matthews' comments and maintained, "I'm not
going to be criticizing jurors or the court." He also called
Matthews' prediction of serving no prison time an "ultimatum" to
Judge Beall that he [Brooks] would never make. Despite his nonconfrontational and repentant attitude, the state Department of
Transportation terminated Brooks' from his position two days
after the jury declared him guilty of extortion. The NAACP
pledged to fight the felony and misdemeanor convictions of
Brooks because it could not allow "the likelihood of a branch president being incarcerated for a felony conviction while carrying out
the program of the NAACP."24 The organization made no similar
promises concerning Matthews.
Despite his mounting legal problems and the NAACP's public
repudiation of his leadership tactics, Matthews continued to organize local blacks via the Northwest Florida SCLC. He contacted
Ralph Abernathy and asked the national SCLC to organize
Pensacola for future demonstrations. Matthews admitted that he
needed help from the Atlanta office to sustain the local struggle
and hoped that national exposure would reveal the injustices that
had transpired in northwest Florida to the nation. Abernathy
seemed excited about the opportunity to intervene and promised
Matthews he would travel to the area within a week. Matthews held
a press conference on July 9 and announced SCLC intentions. He
24. Pensacola Journal, 11 and 13 June 1975; B. J. Brooks v. Department of
Transportation, Florida, 77-2163, case file, Escamhia County Court, Archives
and Records, "Career Service Commission" hearing, Pensacola, Florida,
January 12, 1976.
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announced that, in response to the felony convictions, SCLC "will
be cranking up our activities to include more peaceful protest
demonstrations and picketing in Escambia County." He stated
that white efforts to silence him and cripple local activism "is simply not going to work" because he ignored threats, intimidation,
"physical violence, and whatever else is being done to stamp out
the black demonstrations." Matthews confirmed that SCLC goals
remained "equal treatment for all people and especially the
removal of sheriffs deputy Doug Raines" from his position. To
accomplish the task, he promised that "Pensacola is going to have
the biggest demonstration it had ever seen" on July 12 because
"Ralph Abernathy is coming to town." However, local SCLC 0%cials canceled the proposed march the day after its announcement
when Judge Beall revoked Matthews' bond and ordered him jailed;
~ ~ organizaRalph Abernathy never again visited ~ e n s a c o l a .The
tion that had supported H. K. Matthews and the Pensacola movement abandoned them at the most critical juncture.
On the evening of July 9, as Matthews prepared to speak at St.
Mark AME Zion Church in preparation for the upcoming rally,
county officers arrived at his home with an arrest warrant. The
officers stated that Matthews had violated his bond agreement and
they escorted him to the county jail. At his hearing the next day,
Judge Beall informed Matthews that he was revoking the bond
because the minister continued to plan marches, boycotts, and
demonstrations in the area. The judge stated, "I would have to be
a damned fool" to "allow Matthews freedom while he continued
the same activities he was convicted of." Beall's statement on his
decision implied that he was of the opinion that the jury had convicted Matthews for organizing civil rights demonstrations rather
than criminal extortion against the white power structure. An
unrepentant Matthews told the judge that he had done nothing
wrong and would continue his activism while racial injustice existed in Escambia County. In response, Beall declared him "a threat
to the community," and ordered him returned to prison until sentencing. The incredulous minister told the reporters, "I thought
there was some justice around, but I found out there isn't, especially when it comes to me." Otha Leverette, vice president of the
Escambia County SCLC, canceled the group's scheduled demonstrations, although it is unclear whether he cancelled the protests
25. Pensacola News, 9 and 10 July 9, 1975.
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because he feared suffering Matthews's fate, because local blacks
withdrew from the scheduled demonstrations, or because
Matthews proved irreplaceable as leader of such activities.
Nevertheless, Leverette proclaimed that Matthews's imprisonment
"lets us know we live in a racist ~ o m m u n i t y . " ~ ~
On July 17,1975,Judge Beall sentenced B. J. Brooks and H. K.
Matthews. He gave Brooks five years probation with the stipulation
that he "not conduct or participate in any public demonstration in
the state" during the term. In contrast, he sentenced Matthews to
five years in state prison "at hard labor." The judge defended his
decision by stating that his investigation unearthed "nothing
adverse" in Brooks's past and that the people he interviewed had
"very favorable" things to say about his character. The people he
interviewed concerning Matthews, however, "had nothing good to
say about him." Beall refused to make his investigation discoveries
public and warned attorneys against criticizing the judgment in
the press. Attorneys for each man appealed the sentences after
their a n n o ~ n c e m e n t . ~ ~
Matthews ignored Beall's admonition and called his punishment "no surprise," because he believed "the judge has a personal
vendetta against me." He further proclaimed, "I believe I will get
out of jail pretty quickly." In a July 18 editorial, the Pensacola
Journal questioned the discrepancy between the two penalties. In
a headline that asked "Why was Matthews' treated differently from
Brooks?,"one writer called the minister's five year prison term "an
exceptionally harsh penalty for someone who is, in reality, guilty of
not much more than an excess of rhetoric." It suggested the verdict was a way to silence Matthews, who to many local whites "has
long been a thorn bush obstructing the long and gingerly-trod
road to racial harmony." It further urged Judge Beall to release his
investigation findings to the public so the community could evaluate the reasoning behind the sentences and determine "whether
justice has prevailed, or whether one more black man who has
become a nuisance has been trod upon and kicked aside" by the
white power structure. The editorial represented a surprising
26. Florida v. Brooks and Matthews, case number 75-390,July 10, 1975, case file;
Pensacola News, 10 and 14 July 1975; Pensacola Journal, 11 and 12 July 1975;
Pensacola News-JournaZ, 13July 1975; Matthews, interviewed by author, October
27, 2000, Brewton, Alabama.
27. FZorida v. Brooks and Mattheus, case number 75-390, case file; PensacolaJournal,
15 and 16July 15, 1975; Pensacola News, 17 July 1975.
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reversal of the paper's usual habit of criticizing and deriding black
activists, especially Matthews. Despite the paper's plea, Beall
refused to release his findings or alter his decision. On July 24, the
judge rejected a bail request from Matthews' attorney because the
minister possessed "an utter and total disregard for law and the
legal process and, more particularly, law enforcement officers."28
While B. J. Brooks received financial and legal support from
the NAACP, the organization provided no such assistance to H. K.
Matthews. In addition, the Northwest Florida SCLC severed its
relationship with Matthews after his sentencing and stated the fiery
minister "is not authorized to speak, collect, or solicit funds for this
organization." Its president, F. L. Henderson, stated that the
SCLC "was designed to be a peaceful, nonviolent organization and
this is still our aim.'' Matthews, according to the state representative, had made statements "which do not reflect the official position of the organization." Henderson justified his decision by
portraying Matthews as a radical leader who had infiltrated and
corrupted a peaceful
With the SCLC action, both civil rights organizations that
Matthews once served abandoned him. More importantly, the
Pensacola movement crumbled with no assertive leadership.
However the national SCLC continued to exploit Matthews for
monetary and political gains. In 1978 Atlanta congressman
Andrew Young campaigned on behalf of political prisoners incarcerated in Americanjails. That same year, SCLC adopted the issue
as its primary cause and named Matthews the nation's "Number
One Political Prisoner." SCLC president Joseph Lowery deemed
Matthews "a guy who was in jail because of an unfair, unjust system" and promised SCLC would ask the U. S. Justice Department
to investigate "the criminal system that can produce this outrage."
National SCLC spokesman Hosea Williams told members,
"Matthews was persecuted on a trumped-up charge because he
spoke" against racism in Pensacola and concluded, "It's absolutely
amazing such a thing could happen" in the United States. The
group once again vowed to help Matthews with his legal expenses
but never fulfilled the promise, although SCLC used his name in
28. Pensacola Journal, 18 and 25 July 1975; Rorida v. Brooks, Billie Joe Sr. and
Matth-Hawthorne
Konrade, case number 75-390,case file, Escambia County
Clerk of Court records.
29. Pensacola Journal, 10 December 1975.
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their annual fund-raising drive later that year. In letters asking for
donations to help with their fight against racism in America, SCLC
named Matthews as the example that "the criminal justice system
is still being used against us" and cited his sentence of "five years
for singing a popular marching chant" to raise organization funds.
He received no financial aid as a result of the campaign and
learned of it only when an SCLC member gave Matthews a copy of
the s o l i ~ i t a t i o n . ~ ~
The legal ordeal of H. K. Matthews finally ended on December
13, 1978, when Governor Askew commuted the minister's sentence to the time he had already served in state custody. It was the
last act official Askew conducted as governor of Florida. Despite a
protest letter from Sheriff Royal Untreiner calling the commutation "a gross miscarriage of justice," Askew's cabinet voted 7-0 to
approve the proposal. The governor did not recommend a full
pardon, he explained, because such a decision would nullify the
opportunity for Matthews to appeal his conviction to the United
States Supreme Court. Askew attributed the action to his adherence to free speech rights and stated, "This country must be large
enough to entertain dissent." The governor compared Matthews
to Martin Luther King, Jr. in the harassment and persecution he
endured over the previous years and told him, "I have the privilege
of knowing you . . . and I don't think anyone could have convinced
me that you" chanted the infamous assassination line. Askew
called the decisions rendered against the leader "bad law" and
defended the right to protest by stating, "I know that it's not a popular thing to lead an unpopular cause." Matthews responded to
the sentence reduction by declaring, "I will go to my grave saying
I'm not guilty of any crime the Sheriffs Department has accused
me of." He expressed his disgust with the two organizations that
abandoned his cause by stating, "Never again will I go to the
lengths of getting myself thrown in prison for people who just
don't give a damn." Despite the hopes of Askew and Matthews, the
United States Supreme Court never heard his appeal. In 1979
Florida Governor Robert Graham pardoned matt hew^.^^ The
struggle for racial equality in the Florida panhandle never recovered from the blows it suffered during the turbulent decade.
30. Pensacola Journal, 18 August 1978; Letter, Reverend Joseph Lowery to SCLC
Supporters, October/November 1978, Papers of H. K. Matthews, personal
collection, Brewton, Alabama.
31. Pensacola Journal, 14 and 15 December 14, 1978;
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The fact that national civil rights groups placed their own agendas before the interests of area leaders in Pensacola proved one of
the local movement's largest tragedies. For organizations like the
SCLC, Pensacola's conflicts offered an opportunity to reclaim lost
prestige and present the problems of continuing racism to a national audience. Moreover, the Escambia County situation possessed
elements familiar to the SCLC and NAACP. The protests provided
visible targets in Doug Raines and Royal Untreiner, encountered
police brutality and judicial racism, and implemented nonviolent
tactics SCLC and NAACP activists had utilized during the previous
decade. More importantly, the area movement could have benefited from the intervention of a national civil rights organization. It
would have brought exposure, participants, and a degree of interorganizational cohesion to the local movement.
Instead, the NAACP and SCLC revived tensions that had characterized their relationship since 1957. The NAACP's national and
state offices expressed resentment, jealousy, and frustration in
regard to their rival organization in Escambia County and its charismatic leader, H. K. Matthews. Consequently, the NAACP withdrew
support from the Pensacola black freedom struggle and even used
the fragile economic circumstances of B. J. Brooks, the president of
its local branch, against him for the organization's self-interests.
Soon thereafter, SCLC followed suit by denouncing Matthews and
withdrawing all support from the movement in northwest Florida at
its most crucial point. The local civil rights struggle thus collapsed
while its foremost spokesman served a questionable prison term.
The actions of the NAACP and SCLC in Pensacola raise a
number of issues for scholars of the civil rights movement. As the
problems of racism transitioned from de jure to de facto segregation, Pensacola's experience suggests that organizational infighting between the earlier champions of integration inhibited local
efforts to address injustices. More specifically, the abandonment
of Matthews in his legal fight while simultaneously exploiting his
situation in advertising campaigns suggests an indifference to personal sacrifice and a distance between black leaders and grassroots
members that undermined further advances toward social justice.
Further examinations of other post-1960s grassroots struggles will
reveal if the Pensacola experience with national organizations is an
aberration or tragically commonplace.

Published by STARS, 2007

23

